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I. Introduction
The agriculture industry is essential to developing economies. In poor and developing
countries, agriculture can make up more than fifty percent of total national output, and up to 80
percent of the labor force (Timmer 1988). Even as countries develop and gain wealth, agriculture
“seldom declines to less than 20 percent of any country’s economy” (Timmer 1988). Despite its
massive share in the output of poor countries, the agriculture industry in developing areas is
usually composed of household farms and individual or joint actors making production
decisions. These individual agricultural producers’ decisions play vital roles in the financial state
of a country, national agricultural output, and the potential and path for economic growth.
Understanding how these decisions are made and the factors that influence and shape these
decisions for individual poor farmers is therefore of vital importance.
Agricultural producers in developing countries face incredibly high levels of risk and
uncertainty. At the same time, in poor countries, insurance and credit markets are often absent
and, at best, imperfect. In light of these inadequacies in insurance and credit, farmers and others
must utilize imperfect mechanisms to smooth and boost consumption. For example, farmers may
choose more reliable yet less productive crops, may adopt technology at slower rates, and/or may
utilize a vast network of household and village financial transfers to alleviate disutility from risk
and uncertainty. Understanding how poor farmers manage and mitigate risk can offer insight into
seemingly suboptimal agricultural decisions; these decisions may be better explained by studying
the tools available to them. Moreover, determining the risk and time preferences of poor farmers
can potentially explain certain agricultural decisions that may lead to higher levels of revenue
and savings, and therefore economic growth.
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This study utilizes the baseline survey of a randomized control trial conducted in Malawi
in 2006. Xavier Gine and Dean Yang (2009) use this full experiment to determine the
relationship between insurance, credit, and technology adoption. While Gine and Yang’s
findings are useful in understanding the choices of poor farmers when offered credit to adopt
hybrid seeds and production risk insurance, the data available in the baseline survey remains
potent with fundamental relationships that have yet to be explored. The study and experiment
were conducted by a multitude of organizations and NGOs in 2006. In this study, I utilize
observations from 787 participating farmers in 32 locales in Malawi. I examine how risk and
time preferences among these poor farmers in Malawi can shape and explain different
agricultural inputs and decisions.
This paper’s results show that risk and time preferences have a significant effect on
agricultural production and input decisions. Allocation decisions on labor, tools, technology, and
other inputs can partially be explained by participant’s risk aversion and patience. These same
decisions and inputs are significantly explanatory of savings and credit levels of participants.
Risk and time preferences therefore can significantly explain agricultural decisions, which have
real monetary and financial implications.
The remaining sections are as follows: Section 2 is on Related Literature and describes
related and previously conducted studies; Section 3 is on the Data used and the empirical
background of this study; Section 4 is on the Results found; Section 5 offers Discussion of the
results; Section 6 concludes.
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II. Literature Review
A large portion of literature in development economics focuses on the barriers and
imperfections in the credit, savings, and technology markets. These three markets are usually of
great important both theoretically and empirically because of their connections with household
consumption, savings, and uncertainty and risk. Capital accumulation in the form of savings
central to poor economies because it is most likely the only source for intertemporal
consumption smoothing. Saving at a household level in poor countries “is likely to remain the
predominant source of capital accumulation in developing countries” because of “threats of
expropriation, repudiation and other hostile acts against foreign suppliers of capital, and donor
resistance to significant increases in aid” (Gersovitz 1988). Savings is central to development
theory in that it can allow for smooth consumption in face of volatility and risk in income. In
poor countries, this volatility and risk is higher than in developed countries; “Saving behavior
can only be understood fully after the sources of uncertainty facing decision-makers and their
opportunities for responding to them are specified” (Gersovitz 1988). Insurance adoption and
utilization is, therefore, an essential question in the field of development economics.
An individual’s relationship with savings is inherently connected to the risk and
uncertainty she faces. Gersovitz (1988) explains “a saver’s exposure to these uncertainties
depends not only on whether the variables are random, but also on the opportunities he has for
insurance. Future agricultural income may be risky, but if these risks are insurable through crop
insurance that is actuarial fair, then the individual can insure and need not take this uncertainty
into account in choosing his savings.” Savings, in theory offer the possibility for higher and
smoother consumption. Actuarially fair insurance can offer another option for consumption
smoothing and managing uncertainty and risk. Because of insurance’s potentially significant role
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in consumption, borrowing constraints and imperfections in insurance markets in poor countries
are abundant in development economics literature.
Dercon and Christiansean (2011) summarize the literature on insurance markets in poor
countries well:
Households in poor developing countries are typically ill equipped to cope with large
shocks. Formal insurance schemes are mostly absent and informal risk-sharing
arrangements and savings offer only partial consumption smoothing (Morduch, 1995;
Townsend, 1995, Dercon 2002). Especially the consequences of covariate shocks, such as
droughts, are most often hard felt, often affecting people’s welfare many years after the
shock (Dercon, 2004). In anticipation of such outcomes, households, especially poorer
ones, may opt for less risky technologies and portfolios in order to avoid permanent
damage. Yet, these often also generate lower returns on average (Just and Pope, 1979;
Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993).
As a result, risk may lead to poverty traps where “wealthier agents obtain higher yielding, higher
risk portfolios, while smoothing their consumption.”
Imperfections in insurance markets in poor countries arise because of adverse selection
and moral hazard. Insurance markets may be lacking in developing countries because only the
riskiest clients may seek insurance, or in other words, because of adverse selection. Moreover,
moral hazard, where insurance can create and increase risky behavior, can also lead to
inefficiencies in the insurance market. Trust in insurance contracts can affect the demand side of
insurance markets. If farmers do not believe they will receive a fair payout, demand for
insurance contracts may be low. Karlan et al. (2014) find that farmer investment is constrained
by uninsured risk: “When provided with insurance against the primary catastrophic risk they
face, farmers are able to find resources to increase expenditure on their farms.” Demand for
insurance is nevertheless affected by trust in insurance agencies, and is found to be “in
subsequent years… strongly increasing with the farmer’s own receipt of insurance payouts, with
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the receipt of payouts by others in the farmer’s social network and with recent poor rain in the
village.”
Insurance imperfections sometimes occur in the form of “risk rationing”. Boucher,
Carter, and Guirkinger (2008) highlight this phenomenon, which can lead to inefficiencies in the
insurance market. Boucher et al. explain, “risk rationing occurs when insurance markets are
absent, and lenders, constrained by asymmetric information, shift so much contractual risk to the
borrower that the borrower voluntarily withdraws from the credit market even when she has the
collateral wealth needed to qualify for a loan contract.” As a result, “risk rationed individuals
will retreat to lower expected return activities and occupations” Boucher et al. (2008). Again,
inefficiencies in insurance markets lead to inefficient agricultural outcomes for individuals in
poor countries.
A lack of insurance, or imperfect insurance markets, can lead to low adoption rates of
technology and tools. Dercon and Christiaensen (2011) found in a study in Ethiopia:
“Controlling for unobserved household and time-varying village characteristics, it emerges that
not just ex-ante credit constraints, but also the possibly low consumption outcomes when
harvests fail, discourage the application of fertilizer. The lack of insurance causes inefficiency in
production choices.” Applying fertilizer is a known technology to increase productivity and often
decrease production risk for farmers. As seen in Ethiopia, adoption of fertilizer is limited by
access to insurance. Faced with imperfect insurance markets, poor farmers may lose access to
economic mobility and growth, and may take on risk mitigating behaviors that affect their
output, productivity, and livelihood.
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When actuarially fair insurance is present in poor countries and agrarian economies, takeup of insurance may be lower than theoretically expected. Mobarak and Rosenzweig (2012) find
that take-up of insurance in India is “puzzlingly low,” and may be due to informal risk sharing
practices. In light of imperfect insurance, the poor may have networks and practices of sharing
risk among households, friends, and villages to increase consumption. Nevertheless, these
informal mechanisms are often empirically imperfect, and, for example, rainfall insurance may
still provide value even when informal mechanisms are already in place. Take-up was similarly
low in studies in Andhra Pradesh, India due to a similar hypothesis. Gine, Townsend, and
Vickery (2008) find a 4.6% take-up of rainfall insurance (Gine 2009). Cole et al. (2013) finds a
27% take-up of rainfall insurance in Gujarat. These low take-up rates of insurance correlate well
with the findings of Duflo, Banerjee, and Hornbeck’s (2014) randomized control trial in
Karnataka, India. When bundles with microfinance, health insurance led to a “23 percent dropout from microfinance.” Xavier Gine and Dean Yang (2009) had similar drop offs in insurance
take-up when credit and weather insurance were bundled. The uninsured loan was taken up 33%
more often than the insured loan in their field experiment in Malawi. The result of low take-ups
was low adoption of newer, hybrid seeds that would also increase productivity and reduce
weather related risks.
Limitations in credit markets have similar negative effects on production and potential
consumption levels in poor, agrarian economies. Ideally, markets for credit should allow for
consumption smoothing for even the riskiest of income streams. With poor farmers facing
relatively high levels of risk, credit lines are central to questions of development, savings, and
consumption. Boucher et al. explain, “in a competitive world of symmetric information and
costless enforcement, credit contracts could be written conditional on borrower behavior.
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Borrowers would then have access to loans under any interest rate-collateral combination that
would yield lenders a zero expected profit” (Boucher 2008). However, in effect, these markets
face shortcomings because of issues of information asymmetries, imperfect enforcement, and
failures to adopt technology. These imperfections lead to contracts that that do not offer high
interest rate and low collateral options (Boucher 2008). As a result, there is an overall lacking of
formal credit in developing areas.
Gersovitz (1988) explains the effects of potential borrowing constraints that
disproportionately affect the poor.
“For one thing, the poor may be more desirous of borrowing to offset various shocks
than the rich because: (1) they experience shocks that are proportionately larger, say
because there are economies of scale that discourage them from diversifying their income
sources; or (2) the marginal utility of consumption is such as to place a premium on very
stable consumption at low incomes, say because subsistence requirements must be met;
or (3) the poor save proportionately less than the rich, and so have relatively less wealth
to buffer consumption.”
Access to credit is therefore arguably more important for the poor, but may be in effect
less available.
Credit is also limited by ex-ante and ex-post moral hazard, as well as opportunistic
default. Eswaran and Kotwal (1989) find that the poor “could be less able to smooth
consumption ex-post, due to credit constraints.” Feder, Just and Silberman (1985) alternatively
propose that information costs may be higher for the poor, or they may not be able to access
credit which can lead to difficulty in financing new technology adoption (Alderman and Paxson
1994). A great deal of literature focuses on the limitations in the supply of credit in these poor
countries. Information asymmetries, and borrowers honesty about their ability to fulfill contracts
both affect the availability and breadth of credit available. Similar to the imperfections with
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insurance markets, limitations in credit markets lead to suboptimal agricultural decisions and
lower average consumption.
Finally, technology adoption may be lower in face of imperfect credit and insurance
markets, and high levels of uncertainty and risk. With regards to poor agrarian economies,
Timmer (1988) explains, “technical change is the source of most growth in productivity in the
long run, since continued investment in capital that embodies traditional technology very quickly
faces low marginal returns [Schultz (1964), Hayami and Ruttan (1985)].” Adopting new
technology can lead to increase in output, lower volatility in production level, which in turn can
lead to higher consumption and savings levels. Technological adoption may be low in poor
countries for a multitude of reasons.
One explanation for low technological adoption rates rests in high levels of risk with
limited means for risk mitigation. When “options to smooth consumption ex post” are
constrained, Dercon (1996) finds farmers in Shinyanga, Tanzania utilize sweet potatoes, a less
risky crop, and reduce their income by up to twenty percent in order to decrease risk. Informal
risk mitigating practices may be in competition with technology adoption. Gine and Yang (2009)
find that hybrid seeds, which can increase output and decrease weather related production risk,
are only adopted increasingly more when farmers are offered credit to buy the seeds.
Understanding risk and uncertainty is central to understanding the mechanisms of poor
farmers’ lives and production choices. Poor agricultural workers are wrought with decisions and
uncertainties about their income and consumption levels. These individual decisions aggregate to
create developing economies’ largest industry, agriculture, which is “over 50 percent of national
output and up to 80 percent of the labor force…in early stages of development.” Most
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importantly, the effects of agricultural decisions are always relevant in a country’s economy,
because “’agribusiness’ seldom declines to less than 20 percent of any country’s economy”
(Timmer 1988). The decisions poor farmers make are consistently affected by the risk and
uncertainty they face. Often they “talk primarily about two topics: the weather and prices”
(Timmer, 297). Farmers are consistently subject to volatile and uncertain changes in weather and
price, both of which affect agricultural decisions. When making important farming decisions
about what inputs and labor should be utilized, “the farmer can only guess at the prices for the
output” (Timmer, 298). Risk and uncertainty with regards to weather can lead “farmers to choose
crops that will resist weather extremes, particular varieties of crops that are more tolerant of
weather variations, and lower levels of inputs than would be optimal in a certain world due to the
risk of losing the investment altogether,” and can have “aggregate consequences” because of
widespread weather shocks (Timmer 1988). Therefore, incorporating risk into empirical models
for agricultural decisions is most likely of value. Just (1974) explores a model that incorporates
variability in price, cost, and yield on farmers in California.
James Roumasset (2002) argues that the “constraint” hypothesis is lacking in explanatory
power. This hypothesis “is the proposition that farmers are rational but constrained by a variety
of factors beyond their control. Farmers are said not to adopt recommended practices for
example because they are constrained, not only by risk aversion but by a lack of credit,
irrigation, knowledge and even good weather”. Rousmasset argues these constraints are not in
fact the driving forces for decisions, but instead considering “economic circumstances, market
environment, climate, soil, topography, irrigation, and economic and agro-physical
characteristics” may give a better picture. He furthers that “behavior models that take these
difference into account have relatively high explanatory power” (Roumasset 2002).
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Understanding the impact of risk and uncertainty on poor farmers is essentially tied to
how poor farmers view and deal with risk. Uncertainty and risk leads to three different
phenomenons: risk management, risk coping, and risk sharing (Alderman and Paxson 1994).
Risk management focuses on reducing the variability of income by, for example, choosing to
plant sweet potatoes because it is a safer crop. Risk coping occurs by saving, in order to cope
with shocks and risk intertemporally. Risk sharing occurs when risk is shared across households,
villages, and institutions. Risk coping has been discussed above with relation to saving; risk
copers trade off consumption now for saving and consumption later.
Risk management is intrinsically tied to technology adoption and “crop portfolios”
(Dercon and Christiaensen 2011). Farmers, in order to reduce the high levels of risk and
uncertainty regarding weather and production, often utilize risk management strategies. Dercon
(1996) found a case of modifying crop portfolios for farmers in Shinyanga, who planted sweet
potatoes for more security, even though it led to a 20 percent decrease in income. Kurosaki and
Fafchamps (2002) found another example of modifying the crop portfolio to reduce risk in
Punjab Pakistan, when farmers planted Basmati rice instead of fodder. Tradeoffs between crop
choices and income are a result of imperfect insurance and risk sharing mechanisms. Farmers, to
avoid or minimize risk, intercrop and use geographical terrain to diversify their crops. Because of
imperfections in risk management and sharing mechanisms, farmers are trading vital portions of
their incomes as a form of an insurance premium. (Dercon and Christiaensen 2011).
How poor farmers deal with risk is impacted by their risk preferences. Understanding risk
aversion among these agricultural decision makers can give insight to the risk management and
informal risk sharing mechanisms that are utilized. Poor farmers are theorized to be risk averse,
which leads to agricultural production decisions that avoid or minimize risk. Minimizing this risk
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can lead to lower outputs in the future, and the persistence of poverty in the long run. Risk
sharing and risk coping mechanisms, such as insurance and other rotational savings groups, are
essential for increasing and smoothing consumption, which is highly valuable for the risk averse.
Experimental evidence shows that poor farmers show risk averse preferences and
behaviors. Binswanger (1981) finds in a large experiment in rural India “that a portion of the
observed variation among individual farmers' agricultural decisions can be related in a
systematic manner to variations in the same farmer's experimentally measured degrees of risk
aversion, the more risk averse choosing more conservative options.” This relationship between
experiment and agricultural decisions “suggests the importance of examining the significance of
[their] findings for a number of models of behavior under risk, focusing on the consistency of
our findings with a varied set of theoretical predictions.” Binswanger et al. (1981) find that as
payoffs in the experiment increased, risk aversion increased as well, which “clearly indicates
that, at high levels of income, virtually all individuals are risk averse”. Dillon and Scandizzo
(1978) find in Northern Brazil “that a majority, but by no means all, of the farmers exhibited risk
aversion and that this was more so when subsistence was at risk, and that risk aversion was more
common among small owners than among sharecropper.” In general, “Binswanger (1981) and
Binswanger and Sillers (1983) find that ‘decision makers care only about the losses and gains in
a choice rather than their final wealth positions, which contrasts with expected utility theory’”
(Alderman and Paxson 1994).
Agricultural decisions and risk management strategies can also be partially explained by
time preferences. More patient farmers, those with lower discount factors, may be better at
saving and making more prudent production and consumption decisions. Tanaka, Camerer, and
Nguyen (2010) find in a randomized control trial in Vietnam that time preferences can help
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explain income. More patient farmers had higher incomes in this experiment. Holden, Shiferaw,
and Wik (1998) find in Indonesia, Zambia, and Ethiopia that rates of patience were low, which
led to low levels of environmental protection. These low levels may lead to lower productivity
and increased risk and uncertainty in the future. Time preferences can help explain investment,
consumption, and production choices of poor farmers who may have relatively higher discount
factors.
This paper will explore the link between risk and time preferences and agricultural
decisions. While in much of development literature, risk and time preferences offer great
explanatory power for financial and consumption decisions, their role in agricultural production
choices is often overlooked. Understanding how these preferences can shape production choices,
which can significantly affect savings and income levels can offer a richer picture of the
mechanism by which these preferences affect economic outputs and wellbeing.

III. Data
This paper uses data from an experiment conducted in Malawi by multiple organizations and
used by Xavier Gine and Dean Yang. This randomized control trial data served as the primary
data in Gine’s and Yang’s (2009) study, “Insurance, Credit, and Technology Adoption: Field
Experimental Evidence from Malawi.” This paper will only utilize the results from the baseline
survey conducted for this experiment to analyze fundamental relationships that were left to be
explored in the data.
These organizations include the National Smallholder Farmers Association of Malawi
(NASFAM), Opportunity International Bank of Malawi (OIBM), the Malawi Rural Finance
Corporation (MRFC), the Insurance Association of Malawi (IAM), and the Commodity Risk
Management Group (CRMG) of the World Bank. All of the participating farmers in the study at
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the time were members of NASFAM, the largest farmers association in Malawi. NASFAM
ensured the delivery of the hybrid seeds that were purchased with these loans. The loans
themselves were provided by OIBM and MRFC, two microfinance organizations. IAM and
CRMG worked to design and underwrite the insurance policies offered to the participants.
These organizations collaborated to offer loans to 32 different regions in Malawi. In 16 of the
regions, participants were offered uninsured loans to take up hybrid seeds. In the other 16
regions, participants were offered loans bundled with rainfall insurance. The structure of the
experiment is as follows. OIBM and MRFC offered the loans to clubs of ten to twenty farmers;
individual farmers made the decision to take up the loan, but liability was to be joint for the
entire club. In June and July 2006, NASFAM contacted these clubs of farmers to participate in
this study. From the 159 clubs contacted, 787 farmers consented to participation. 393 of those
participants were located in the treatment areas, and 394 were located in the control areas.
The farmers from the control section, the 16 areas that were offered the uninsured loan, were
offered a standard contract of debt for the hybrid seeds. A deposit of 12.5% of the product was
required in advance. The participants could choose between improved groundnut only or an
improved groundnut and hybrid maize seed and fertilizer package. The improved groundnut was
found to be more effective than traditional seeds. It produced higher yields, need less time for
maturation, had higher disease resistance and drought resistance, and had higher oil content. The
groundnut package (ICGV-SM 90704) offered 32 kilograms of seed, which should suffice for
one acre of land. This improved groundnut was valued at MK 4692, and was to be repaid about
ten months later. The participants faced an annual interest rate of about 33%. Therefore, in the
ten month period, MK 1012 was payment for interest, and MK 3680 was cost of the improved
groundnut. For the hybrid maize package, total cost was MK 4972.50, with MK 3900 being for
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the seeds and fertilizer that was sufficient for half an acre of land, and MK 1072.50 being for the
interest. This hybrid maize (DK 8051) package was similarly more efficient than traditional
varieties; it had higher yield and was more resistant to disease and drought than even other
hybrid varieties.
The farmers in the treatment section, the 16 areas that were offered the insured loans, were
offered a bundled contract of debt for the hybrid seeds. The debt contract was identical to that
offered to the control group, but they were also offered an actuarially fair rainfall insurance
policy. This insurance policy was required to take up the loan. The insurance premium varied by
locality. In premium on the improved groundnut package varied from MK 297.98 to MK 529.77.
For the hybrid maize package, the insurance premium ranged from MK 647.16 to MK 1082.29.
The insurance plan offered was contingent on rainfall. Depending on the amount of rainfall, the
insurance plan would have partial or total payouts for the principal and interest. The total cost of
the insurance was a calculated actuarially fair premium and a 17.5% government surtax. The
level of rainfall was measured at the nearest weather station; there were four weather stations in
total. The time span of coverage was segmented into three phases, sowing, flowering, and
harvest. Each of these phases had unique upper and lower threshold values that would have to be
met for a payout. If the upper threshold is exceeded, no payout was given. The contract offered a
payment for each millimeter of rainfall below the upper threshold. When the lower threshold was
met, the contract offered a higher payout. The model of this insurance contract was specifically
drafted for the improved groundnut and hybrid maize packages. The total payout to be received
over the three phases would equal the loan, premium, and interest.
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In September 2006, all farmers in the experiment participated in a household socioeconomic
survey. This survey included questions on education, assets, savings habits, crop production, risk
aversion, knowledge and trust of insurance and financial tools, and income. After the conduction
of the baseline survey, participants were offered in October 2006 the option to take up the loan.
The baseline survey is composed of fifteen different sections. The first section is a household
roster, which is twelve questions about the composition of the household, and characteristics
such as schooling, age, and literacy levels. This section also includes characteristics on the
construction of the participant’s home and length of time in the current village. The next section
includes questions on the characteristics of the member of the NASFAM club, which will not be
used in this paper. The third section is questions on land cropping patterns, such as the types of
trees planted and the number of growing seasons per plot. The fourth section is on crop
production, such as the types and values of seeds planted. The fifth section is on crop sales and
marketing, which includes questions on the timing, value, and place of sales of agricultural
outputs. The sixth section is on the participant’s perceptions, primarily with regards to
agriculture and weather. Questions include perceptions on levels and changes of rainfall in past
years and perceptions on production levels in past years. The seventh section is on amounts,
sources, and types of credit accessed in the past. The eight sections are on amounts, sources, and
types of savings the household has. The ninth section is on the type of livestock owned. The
tenth section is on the networks and sources of information for the participant and household.
The eleventh section questions the amounts of received and given remittances. The twelfth
section is on sources of income. The thirteenth section is on the willingness to pay for insurance,
and is not used in this paper. The fourteenth section is on self-perceived personality, with
questions including whether the participant would describe herself as optimistic and/or confident.
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The final section is on risk response and risk attitudes, with questions on consumption changes in
response to risk and theoretical gambles to highlight risk preferences.
The data consists of 787 consenting participants in 32 different regions. 393 participants were
located in the areas offered insured loans, and the remaining 394 participants were located in the
areas offered uninsured loans.

IV. Empirical Section
Methodology and Variables
The baseline survey of the MTARI study in Malawi included a variety of variables on
NASFAM club farmers. These baseline characteristics collected in 2006 offer the opportunity to
explore fundamental relationships that were not central to Xavier Gine and Dean Yang’s (2008)
paper, “Insurance, Credit, and Technology Adoption: Field Experimental Evidence from
Malawi”. To examine the relationship between risk and time preferences and agricultural
decisions, I ran a series of Tobit regressions for each variable collected from the baseline survey.
In order to account for left censoring in many of the variables created from the baseline survey
and avoid bias in my coefficients, I ran a series of Tobit regressions instead of OLS regressions.
OLS regression results may be found in the appendix.
All variables used in this paper can be seen in Table 1, which describes the mean,
standard deviation, and maximum and minimum value of all included. First, I ran series of
regressions of all explanatory variables on total savings, total credit, and net savings (savings
minus credit). For each, I ran a series of four to five regressions to determine the explanatory
value of the variables. Within these regressions multiple variables are likely to be endogenous
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and bias coefficients. To gain a more clear understanding of the impact of risk and time
preferences, I conducted the final set of regressions with more likely to be exogenous variables.
Finally, to examine the relationship between agricultural decisions and these preferences, I ran a
series of Tobit regressions with each decision as a dependent variable, and the risk and time
preferences as the independent variables.
All variables were collected from the baseline survey. The variables are listed in Table 1.
Some of the variables are descriptive characteristics of the household and participant, such as the
gender of the head of household, whether or not the participant is literate, and self proclaimed
characteristics such as health status, self confidence, if decisions are made joint or unilaterally,
and pessimism. Among these variables, gender of head of household, literacy, self-confidence,
decision making (as joint or unilateral) and pessimism are all binary variables because of the
nature of questions asked in the survey. Other variables used from the baseline survey measure
the financial status of the household. These variables include the total value saved in local
currency (MK), the rental price of plots owned (MK), the total value of seeds used in production
(MK), the total value of crops produced (MK), the variance in revenue (MK), the number of
ROSCAs participating in, the value of annual income (MK), and whether or not the family faced
a dramatic decrease in income in the last five years, which is a dummy variable.
Further variables measure preferences of participants with regards to risk and time. Risk
aversion variables were pulled from four different questions in the baseline survey. These are
tested as four different variables to determine which form of questions gives the best insight into
the participants’ preferences. The first risk aversion variable is created from the data results in
question O18 in the baseline survey and is as follows:
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O18) You are going to play a game, I am going to flip a coin. Imagine that you would get
the money shown under the GREEN area if it lands on heads or the money shown under
WHITE area if it lands on tails. The amount you would win depends on the bet you
choose. Which bet would you choose?
The respondent is offered six different bundles to choose from, 50/50, 40/120, 30/160, 20/190,
10/210, and 0/220. With each bundle the risk and rewards both increase, so the respondent’s
choice can be an indicator of their risk preference. The risk aversion variable used in this paper
from this question is a linear measure with values from 1 to 6, with 6 being least risk averse.
There are three more measures of risk aversion offered in the survey with question O17. The
participants are asked:
O17) On the face scale from where sad face means, “I always try to avoid taking risk”
and smiley face means “I am fully prepared to take risks”. How would you rate your
willingness to take risks… (a) In general (b) with your health (c) in trying new crops
varieties.
Respondents are allowed to answer each question with a value between 0 and 10, and are showed
a scale with a sad face next to 0 and smiley face with 10. This is another linear indicator of risk
preferences. Only the measures for new crop varieties and health are correlated and statistically
significant when regressed on the first measure of risk aversion, as seen in Table 6. This may
mean participants did not understand part (a), when asked how much risk they are willing to take
on in general, but could better actualize the question with regards to health and crop decisions.
Time preferences are measured in two ways. Question O13 offers three different bundles
where the participant can have 1000MK today, or a greater value in 30 days. If the participant
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chooses any value other than the 1000MK today, it means they have a degree of patience that can
be compensated by the higher bundle offered. This question’s results are created into a dummy
variable, patient, where if the respondent chooses any bundle other than the 1000MK today, they
are patient. A continuous time preference variable is created with question O14, which asks:
O14) If the answer in a, b, c is (1), then: How much would the prize have to be for you to
choose to wait 30 days MK
The difference between the prizes the participant chooses and the 1000MK offered today is
calculated as their discount factor. A higher discount factor is related to a lower amount of
patience.
The remaining variables are all related to agricultural decisions and inputs. These
variables include the number of types of trees that are planted, total acreage of plots, number of
growing seasons for all plots, total amount spent on chemical protection (MK), total amount
spent on fertilizer (MK), total amount spent on implementation tools (MK), total amount spent
on irrigation (MK), total amount spent on manual labor (MK), total amount spent on manure
(MK), total amount spent on oxen labor (MK), dummy variables for the usage of child labor or
machine labor, total amount spent on manure (MK), the mean number of vendors used, the total
amount of crops produced (kgs), and the ratio of sole to intercropped crops.

Results
Table 2 shows the results from regressing all of the variables listed in Table 1 on the total
amount of savings the participant and/or their household has. Income and savings are positively
correlated; with a 1 MK increase in income leading to a .0673 MK increase in savings. This
result is most likely biased because income and savings are likely jointly determined. The mean
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number of vendors is positively correlated with savings as well. Utilizing one more vendor on
average correlates with a 2476 MK increase in savings. Working with more vendors may
increase risk and liabilities for farmers with the possibility of more flexibility and return. This
correlation may indicate that farmers who save can afford the higher risk associated with
vendors. With regards to agricultural choices, the significant results are as follows. The ratio of
sole to intercropped crops is also consistently statistically significant at a 5% level. If the
household only has sole crops, and does no intercropping, they are likely to have 12563 MK
more in savings than a household that does entirely intercropping. Intercropping and saving are
two methods to potentially deal with risk, with the two potentially acting as substitutes.
Intercropping may reduce the willingness of the family to save, or high saving ability may allow
families to not intercrop and face higher but more volatile returns. Spending on oxen labor,
chemical protection, and spending on manual labor are all statistically significant at the 1% level.
1 MK spending more on oxen labor is correlated with 7.335 MK more saving, 1MK spending on
chemical protection is correlated with 6.191 MK more in savings, and 1 MK spending more on
manual labor is correlated with a 2.166 MK increase in savings. Each of these choices is
positively correlated with savings. Each of these choices can also be seen as investments in
agricultural production. The positive correlation with savings may indicate the propensity to
invest in these farmers; if willing to invest in savings, farmers may also be willing to invest in
these choices for the same reasons. The total acres of land the household uses is positively
correlated with savings. Each increased acre leads to 952.2 MK more in savings. Both savings
and land are investments in the financial status of the family, so the positive correlation may be
an indicator of the household’s attitude towards investment. Households may also need to save
up in order to purchase more land in the future.
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Tables 3 and 4 show the results of regressing on credit and net savings respectively. For
credit, spending on implementation tools is significant at the 1% level. An increase in one MK of
spending on implementation tools has an increase of 5.415MK in credit. Buying implementation
tools is most likely very costly up front, and may have high transaction costs associated with it.
Spending on manual labor has a similar yet smaller effect with a correlated 1.063MK increase in
credit. Spending on manure also has a positive correlation, with 2.62MK increase in credit for
every credit dollar. This is most likely for the same reason as the relationship with manual labor.
Farmers who view themselves as progressive have 7392MK less in credit than those who do not.
Those who are pessimistic also have credit taken out that is 7974MK lower than those who are
not. Risk aversion is negatively correlated with credit; each point of risk aversion has a
correlated 2243MK less in credit. Credit is risky, and progressive, pessimistic, and/or risk averse
farmers may like to avoid risk. Finally, higher variance in revenue has a small positive effect of
.015 on credit, which indicates that it may be used in a negligible amount to smooth
consumption. Table 4 on net savings shows similar results to those found with credit and
savings. There is a positive correlation between income, plot size, chemical protection spending,
manual labor spending, the mean number of vendors used, oxen labor spending, and the sole
ratio.
In Table 5, we can observe the relationship between agricultural decisions and the four
different measures of risk aversion and the continuous time preference variable. These ten
regressions conducted ideally lessen the bias from endogeneity that the previous regressions
faced. In the regressions on savings, credit, and net savings, many of the independent variables
are most likely jointly determined with the dependent variables. For example, income and
savings are most likely jointly determined, and would bias the coefficients. Table 5 shows the
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effect of risk and time preferences on agricultural decisions; ideally these variables are less likely
to be jointly determined than in prior regressions. Nevertheless, the preferences and decisions
may be jointly determined and face an endogeneity problem. For example, farmers who face
dramatic income shocks in recent times may answer the questions indicating they are less patient
and more risk averse afterwards. In this case, coefficients may still be biased and the issues of
endogeneity with risk and time preferences should be further explored.
Column 1 shows the regression of risk and time preferences on the total amount of
spending on implementation tools. None of the preferences are statistically significant for this
regression. Column 2 shows the regression of these preferences on variance in total revenue. The
risk aversion variable is positively correlated, but not statistically significant. Risk willingness in
general, when increased by one unit, is correlated with an 8554 MK increase in revenue variance,
and is statistically significant at a 5% level. In other words, less risk averse farmers make
decisions that are riskier, which leads to higher fluctuations in income. Risk willingness with
health decisions is statistically significant at the 5% level, and is negatively correlated with
revenue variance. This may indicate that riskier and higher reward streams of revenue require
healthier bodies. Taking fewer risks with health may be central to obtaining higher and more
volatile income streams. Column 3 shows the relationship between the preferences and the
dummy variable of the household having had a dramatic decrease in income in the last five
years. Only the two general risk aversion preference variables are statistically significant in this
regression, and both are positive in sign. Each unit decrease in risk aversion is correlated with a
2.13% increase in the chance of having faced a dramatic risk in the past. Each unit increase in
general willingness to take on risk explains a .936% increase in the chance of having faced this
income decrease in the past five years. Less risk averse farmers may have made riskier decisions
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in the past year, which has led to dramatic shocks to income. Column 4 shows the regression of
the ratio of sole to intercropped crops on risk and time preferences. Risk willingness with regards
to health, and in general, are both statistically significant and positively correlated with this ratio
of sole to intercropped crops. These effects are relatively small, and may indicate that the sole to
intercrop ratio helps ration risk. Column 5 is the same regression with the amount spent on oxen
labor as the independent variable. None of the preferences are statistically significant. Column 6
is the regression with the mean number of vendors used as the independent variable. Risk
willingness in general and with regards to crops are both statistically significant with the number
of vendors. Risk willingness in general is positively correlated, with a one-unit increase in risk
willingness explaining a .0534 increase in mean vendors used. Each individual vendor poses a
higher risk of a contract falling through or not being fulfilled as promised. Interestingly, when
risk willingness with regards to crop variety is increased by one unit, the number of mean
vendors decreases by .0579. This may mean that farmers who are more willing to take on risk
with their crops are not willing to take on the risk of having many vendors. This result may be an
indicator of the preference of risk distribution for households. Finally, more impatient farmers
utilize a higher number of vendors. Statistically significant at 1%, each 1 MK increase in the
time discount factor is correlated with an 8.40e-07 increase in mean vendors used. While the
magnitude is small, the time discount factor had a mean of 60095.95 MK. Those who are more
impatient may deal with more vendors because they can get payouts earlier rather than later, or
can potentially bargain for better deals if willing to wait with more competition among vendors.
Column 7 regressed the preferences on total amount spent on manure. Only risk aversion comes
up as statistically significant. One unit increase in risk aversion is correlated with 340.6 MK
lower spending on manure. More manure may offer less certainty in production output and can
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increase risk and uncertainty. Column 8 regresses on total spent on manual labor (MK). No
preferences are statistically significant except for time discount factor at the 10% level. More
patient people spend less on manual labor. Column 9 shows the regression on total plot area
(acres). Only risk willingness with regards to health is statistically significant. One unit increase
in this risk willingness explains a .108 acres decrease in plot size. Increasing plot size may be
more labor intensive, so farmers willing to invest in land may be risk averse with regards to their
health (and the possibility of not being able to use their own bodies for labor). Column 10 shows
the regression on total spent for chemical protection (MK). Similar to column 9, only risk
willingness with regards to health is statistically significant and negative in sign. One unit
increase in risk willingness explains a 176.1 MK decrease in spending on chemical protection.
Farmers who invest in protecting crops are taking resources away from tools that make labor
more efficient and less necessary. Allocating resources to protection means the farmer may be
more unwilling to take on risks with their health because their labor is important.
All of these coefficients, for regressions found in tables two through five, were
downwardly biased when using the OLS regressions shown in the appendix. These coefficients
in the Tobit regression are higher than the coefficients in the OLS regression because of the left
censoring of the variables. For example, when looking at the effects on savings, there are effects
on savings we cannot observe with the data. When farmers would like to dissave (save negative
amounts), but cannot, they record having zero savings. Frustrated farmers unable to dissave are
treated the same in the data as farmers who do not wish to save. Therefore, the censored data of
the frustrated farmers results in a downward biased OLS coefficient because all negative values
in this case (of the frustrated farmer who wishes to dissave) are treated as zeros. In this case, the
OLS estimates would appear too flat. In order to adjust for this downward bias in the OLS

!

24!

regression, I run Tobit regressions and find the same statistically significant patterns, with higher
coefficients, indicating that the OLS estimates were in fact biased downwards.

V. Discussion
Examining risk and time preferences on agricultural choice may offer a richer picture of the
individual farmer’s decision-making process. The results of this paper highlight two topics for
discussion: the validity of surveying risk preferences, and risk and time preferences’ explanatory
power in agricultural decisions. Binswanger et. al find that farmers are risk averse and treat
experimental gambles similarly to actual production choices. Yet other researchers find that
these experimental are restricted by the cognitive abilities of participants and the context of the
questions asked. For example, Cook et al. (2013) find in Kolkata, India “a sizeable minority had
difficulty understanding the experiment, and participants were influenced by the context in
which the experiments 20 occurred (these problems are not unique to our study)…[which] adds
to a growing literature that suggests that risk aversion elicitation approaches are sensitive to
context and cognitive abilities of participants.” The baseline survey used for this paper had four
different questions that elicited risk preferences. One included hypothetical gambles in
increasing riskiness and payout, and three general self-reported risk willingness metrics
separated with regards to general decisions, health related, and crop related. Each of these
questions offered different explanatory results for the agricultural decisions the farmers had
made. Moreover, each metric was only slightly correlated with one another. All of the risk
preference variables correlate weakly, with the greatest correlation between risk willingness
(general) and risk willingness (health) at .38. The weakest correlation was a surprising -.0173
between risk aversion (gambles) and risk willingness (health). Differences in responses to these
four questions may be influenced by competency and cognitive ability. These differences may
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also highlight significant differences with regards to risk preferences. As seen in the main results
of this paper, farmers may be much less willing to take risks with their health when their own
bodies are needed for manual labor. Understanding risk taking with regards to crop choices and
health may be easier to understand compared to the relatively ambiguous question on risk
willingness in general.
Each of the four risk preference measures offer significant explanatory power in the
agricultural decisions focused on in this paper. Time preference seems to play less of a role in
this decision making process, which may highlight the lack of flexibility in scheduling for
farmers. These participants, even if highly impatient, may not have many opportunities to take
large risks that potentially pay out immediately. The agricultural decisions tested in this paper,
except for mean vendors used, are not well explained by time preferences potentially for this
reason.
Risk preferences can explain variance in revenue and if a family faced a dramatic
negative shock to income in the past five years. Risk preferences can also explain participants’
allocation of resources. Those who are more risk willing with regards to their health have smaller
plots, spend less on chemical protection, intercrop less, and have lower revenue variance. Higher
risk willingness with regards to crops only significantly affects the mean number of vendors
used, which implies that taking more perceived risks on crops decreases the willingness to take
risks with more vendors. Being more risk willing in general reasonably means a higher
likelihood of having faces dramatic income risk and higher revenue variance, but also more sole
cropping and vendors used. Intercropping appears to be a form of risk management, with more
risk willingness associated with sole cropping. Utilizing more vendors is a risky endeavor, and
may not be preferred if risks are already taken with crop choices and management.
!

26!

These agricultural decisions are significantly correlated with higher levels of savings.
Utilizing more vendors, having more land, sole cropping, and using chemical protection and
manure all explain higher levels of savings. Risk preferences, which can be separated into
distinct categories with regards to in general, and with health and crops, can explain agricultural
choices, which lead to higher levels of savings. These higher levels of savings, arguably, can
lead to boosted and smoother consumption for families, and may offer economic mobility in the
future. Therefore, risk preferences may not be correlated directly with savings, but instead
through a mechanism of influencing agricultural production choices.

VI. Conclusion
Understanding how poor farmers deal with risk and uncertainty and large amounts of
decision-making can offer insight into savings, consumption, and economic growth. Central to
this understanding must be both risk management and risk preferences. While savings, insurance,
and technology can all boost consumption and offer smoother consumption, risk and time
preferences can help explain the choices farmers make. In this paper, risk preferences are
explored with regards to health and with crop as well, which offers insight into nuances within
risk preferences, and the potential cognitive limitations of participants.
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Table(1(6(Descrip0ve(Sta0s0cs
Total amount saved
Total price of plot rentals
Value of seeds
Value of crops produced
Revenue Variance
Number of ROSCAs
Net Remittances
Income
Dramatic Income Risk (past 5 yrs)
Number of types of trees
Acreage of plots
Number of growing seasons
Total spent on chemical protection
Is child labor used?
Total spent on fertilizer
Total spent on implementation tools
Total spent on irrigation
Is machine labor used
Total spent on manual labor
Total spent on manure
Mean vendors
Total spent on oxen labor
Total crops produced (kgs)
Sole ratio
Head of household gender
Self health status
Literate
Joint decisions made in household
Progressive famer
Pessimism
Self confidence
Time discount factor
Patient
Risk willingness (crops)
Risk willingness (health)
Risk willingness (general)
Risk aversion

Obs

Mean(

Standard(Devia0on

Min

Max

1087
1087
1087
1087
1087
1087
1087
1087
1087
1087
1087
1087
1087
1087
1087
1087
1087
1087
1087
1087
1087
1087
1087
1087
1087
1087
1087
1087
1087
1087
1087
1087
1087
1087
1087
1087
1087

20023.74
8715.322
1235.62
9980.649
32423.24
0.0781969
164.8974
7901.594
0.7433303
68.56469
4.2442
1.012657
131.1377
0.0340386
791.902
61.77553
47.35971
0.025759
1700.919
269.5017
1.133073
211.4853
834.8279
0.849149
0.8776449
1.882245
0.2106716
0.7681693
1.574977
1.878872
2.438822
60095.95
0.0910764
7.091076
4.125115
5.324747
3.535419

51377.26
46010.63
3096.099
115765.9
334392
0.2852308
2078.598
50215.55
0.4369966
404.603
5.283635
0.1873099
959.8915
0.1814119
10450.48
1045.488
405.4263
0.1584883
5698.29
1599.026
1.644556
934.9459
1920.095
0.3285485
0.3278463
1.045435
0.4079733
0.4221957
0.7101211
0.8905446
1.237714
259303.9
0.2878501
3.513193
3.759945
3.704604
2.115101

0
0
0
0
-456680
0
-30000
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1010000
1000000
56740
3715050
6532680
2
28050
1185000
1
10014
70
2
26025
1
245000
30000
9000
1
86500
38900
18
15150
33777
1
1
5
1
1
3
5
4
3999900
1
10
10
10
6
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Table 2- Effects on Savings (Tobit)
VARIABLES
Head of household gender
Self reported health status
Literacy
Joint decision making
Progressive farmer
Pessimism
Self confidence
Patience
Risk aversion

(1)

(2)

8676
(5,907)
-851.5
(1,733)
-11,140**
(4,598)
718.1
(4,367)
-7,230***
(2,548)
-678.3
(2,013)
1602
(1,459)
4351
(6,149)
-275.5
(834.4)

Rental price of all plots

0.0294
(0.0374)
1.855***
(0.562)
0.00596
(0.0148)
0.00584
(0.00515)
4971
(6,093)
-0.724
(0.849)
0.0779**
(-0.0349)
-6527
(4,042)

Value of seeds
Value of crops
Revenue variance
Number of ROSCAs
Net remittances
Income
Income shock (<5 years)
Number of types of trees
Area of plots (acres)
Total number of growing seasons
Chemical protection spending
Child labor
Fertilizer spending
Implementation spending
Irrigation spending
Machine labor
Manual labor spending
Manure spending
Mean number of vendors
Oxen labor spending
Crops produced (kgs)
Sole ratio
Risk willingness (crops)
Time discount
Constant
Sigma

Observations

(3)

18,808*
(10,545)
56,420***
(1,331)

14,988***
(3,585)
56,418***
(1,332)

1.832
(-4.315)
597.9*
(-350.5)
-8028
(8,915)
6.488***
(1.704)
-2899
(8,978)
-0.159
(0.162)
-1.842
(1.553)
3.159
(-3.965)
-4495
(10,506)
2.252***
(0.317)
1.851*
(1.014)
2,394**
(1,001)
7.845***
(1.813)
1.533
(0.952)
12,476**
(5,135)
715.6
(474.9)
-0.00386
(0.00638)
-6185
(10,783)
52,576***
(1,239)

1,087
1,087
1,087
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(4)
7253
(5,492)
-795.8
(1,632)
-5823
(4,313)
218.6
(4,072)
-2969
(2,411)
-97.16
(1,887)
1142
(1,359)
2457
(5,726)
-13
(785.7)
-0.062
(0.0441)
-0.0466
(0.579)
-0.00595
(0.0138)
0.0053
(0.0048)
1321
(5,715)
-1.262
(0.797)
0.0673**
(0.0324)
-5830
(3,791)
-0.126
(4.364)
952.2**
(408)
-6369
(8,895)
6.191***
(1.719)
-5355
(8,998)
-0.127
(0.162)
-1.926
(1.542)
2.682
(3.953)
-7471
(10,475)
2.166***
(0.317)
1.741*
(1.011)
2,476**
(1,003)
7.335***
(1.813)
1.16
(1.007)
12,563**
(5,137)

-1527
(14,020)
52,034***
(1,227)

1,087
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Table 3- Effects on Credit (Tobit)
VARIABLES
Head of household gender
Self reported health status
Literacy
Joint decision making
Progressive farmer
Pessimism
Self confidence
Patience
Risk aversion

(1)

(2)

611.3
(8,599)
-460.2
(2,533)
-4481
(6,739)
-7098
(6,328)
-9,302**
(3,742)
-7,161**
(3,063)
2798
(2,136)
-793.2
(8,970)
-2,583**
(1,217)

Rental price of all plots

-0.146
(0.179)
1.230*
(0.735)
-0.00167
(0.0265)
0.0144**
(0.00621)
9252
(8,730)
0.338
(1.334)
-0.0835
(0.0877)
-12,687**
(5,749)

Value of seeds
Value of crops
Revenue variance
Number of ROSCAs
Net remittances
Income
Income shock (<5 years)
Number of types of trees
Area of plots (acres)
Total number of growing
seasons
Chemical protection spending
Child labor
Fertilizer spending
Implementation spending
Irrigation spending
Machine labor
Manual labor spending
Manure spending
Mean number of vendors
Oxen labor spending
Crops produced (kgs)
Sole ratio
Risk willingness (crops)
Time discount
Constant
Sigma

Observations

(3)

-14282
(15,177)
64,121***
(2,752)

-42,902***
(5,567)
64,491***
(2,771)

-15.83
(14.65)
-402.4
(648.9)
22910
(14,004)
2.439
(2.17)
-11524
(14,800)
0.0715
(0.224)
5.377***
(1.927)
2.616
(5.866)
6122
(15,266)
1.142***
(0.431)
2.926**
(1.27)
-1635
(1,779)
-1.227
(2.655)
0.365
(1.519)
12162
(8,250)
-39.04
(-724.3)
-0.00937
(0.0122)
-82,246***
(17,418)
63,032***
(2,702)

1,087
1,087
1,087
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(4)
1117
(8,413)
-201.5
(2,518)
-1595
(6,657)
-6127
(6,247)
-7,392**
(3,725)
-7,974***
(3,042)
2598
(2,104)
-3277
(8,823)
-2,243*
(1,206)
-0.105
(0.206)
0.789
(0.79)
-0.00345
(0.0298)
0.0150**
(0.0061)
4447
(8,681)
0.46
(1.365)
-0.103
(0.0931)
-10,110*
(-5,684)
-13.49
(14.75)
-421.1
(742)
24,143*
(13,824)
2.097
(2.178)
-9839
(14,831)
0.195
(0.224)
5.415***
(1.906)
1.625
(5.992)
9619
(15,137)
1.063**
(0.432)
2.620**
(1.259)
-1407
(1,761)
-2.413
(2.698)
-0.576
(1.69)
10970
(8,221)

-42,860**
(21,625)
61,822***
(-2,638)

1,087
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Table 4- Effects on Net Savings (Tobit)
VARIABLES
Head of household gender
Self reported health status
Literacy
Joint decision making
Progressive farmer
Pessimism
Self confidence
Patience
Risk aversion

(1)

(2)

9573
(6,281)
-646.6
(1,833)
-11,311**
(4,870)
1598
(4,619)
-6,361**
(2,699)
-443.9
(2,122)
1323
(1,542)
5304
(6,465)
-221.5
(881.9)

Rental price of all plots

0.0325
(0.0391)
1.512**
(0.606)
0.00472
(0.0155)
0.000883
(0.00538)
3711
(6,464)
-1.074
(0.899)
0.0867**
(0.0365)
-6425
(4,273)

Value of seeds
Value of crops
Revenue variance
Number of ROSCAs
Net remittances
Income
Income shock (<5 years)
Number of types of trees
Area of plots (acres)
Total number of growing
seasons
Chemical protection spending
Child labor
Fertilizer spending
Implementation spending
Irrigation spending
Machine labor
Manual labor spending
Manure spending
Mean number of vendors
Oxen labor spending
Crops produced (kgs)
Sole ratio
Risk willingness (crops)
Time discount
Constant
Sigma

Observations

(3)

10654
(11,230)
58,897***
(1,456)

10,656***
(3,797)
58,907***
(1,457)

-0.869
(4.567)
613.7*
(372.1)
-10743
(9,496)
6.102***
(1.808)
-1759
(9,573)
-0.21
(0.187)
-2.547
(1.914)
3.429
(4.206)
-4418
(11,263)
1.901***
(0.339)
0.915
(1.146)
2,743**
(1,066)
8.661***
(1.934)
1.272
(1.017)
10,685*
(5,477)
601.8
(506.6)
-0.0032
(0.00678)
-5405
(11,481)
55,521***
(1,373)

1,087
1,087
1,087
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(4)
7985
(5,902)
-599.1
(1,746)
-7102
(4,622)
668.7
(4,356)
-2464
(2,583)
367.9
(2,014)
1043
(1,453)
3693
(6,098)
45.64
(840.5)
-0.0666
(0.0468)
-0.498
(0.69)
-0.00585
(0.0146)
0.000287
(0.00508)
935.2
(6,125)
-1.581*
(-0.855)
0.0764**
(0.0343)
-6279
(4,052)
0.862
(4.62)
1,045**
(434.9)
-9080
(9,486)
6.007***
(1.826)
-4929
(9,609)
-0.18
(0.186)
-2.652
(1.893)
3.059
(4.195)
-7692
(11,248)
1.807***
(0.34)
0.858
(1.143)
2,920***
(1,071)
8.139***
(1.935)
1.207
(1.092)
10,881**
(5,488)

-4093
(15,007)
54,979***
(1,360)
1,087
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(2)
Revenue
Variance

0.0213**
(0.01)
0.00936*
(0.00)
-0.00419
(0.00)
0.0156***
(0.00)
2.38E-08
(0.00)
0.745***
(0.03)

0.0034
(0.01)
0.00794**
(41.36)
3.579
(41.96)
-35.29
(39.48)
-3.88E-05
(0.00)
-2,964***
(429.20)

-58.62
(63.45)
50.54

(0.02)
-0.0579**
(0.02)
-0.0316
(0.02)
8.40e-07***
(0.00)
0.648***
(0.23)

-0.0179
(0.04)
0.0534**

(108.20)
-49.52
(107.30)
-60.24
(101.40)
0.000796
(0.00)
-7,959***
(1,168.00)

-340.6**
(164.50)
167.5

(7)
Manure
Spending

(126.30)
163.5
(129.10)
-166.2
(120.90)
-0.00371*
(0.00)
-4,729***
(1,216.00)

-298.3
(194.60)
-29.58

(8)
Manual Labor
Spending

(0.05)
0.0645
(0.05)
-0.108**
(0.05)
-2.22E-08
(0.00)
4.046***
(0.46)

0.0267
(0.08)
0.0135

(9)
Plot Area

(64.69)
-7.897
(62.89)
-176.1***
(64.29)
-0.000896
(0.00)
-5,391***
(738.40)

158.3
(100.30)
37.9

(10)
Chemical
Protection
Spending

(5)
(6)
Oxen Labor Mean Vendors

(1)
Implementatio
n Spending

1,997
(5552.00)
8,554**
(0.01)
0.000297
(0.01)
-0.00681
(0.01)
4.27E-08
(0.00)
0.569***
(0.05)

4,035***
(313.50)

(4)
Sole Ratio

325.6
(834.70)
-210.2
(3594.00)
-4,784
(3642.00)
-6,870**
(3428.00)
0.0123
(0.04)
-14,750
(33,760.00)

5.294***
(0.11)

(3)
Dramatic Risk

(517.60)
162.4
(501.30)
-1,006
(648.60)
-0.0162
(0.02)
-34,168***
(9,533.00)

11,231***
(439.80)

1,087

6,825***
(521.70)

1,087

2.436***
(0.07)

1,087

3,023***
(179.80)

1,087

0.359***
(0.01)

1,087

0.571***
(0.02)

1,087

371,748***
(8879.00)

1,087

16,282***
(3813.00)

Table 5-Agricultural Decisions on Preferences (Tobit)
VARIABLES

Risk aversion
Risk willingness (general)

Risk willingness (crop)
Risk willingness (health)
Time discount
Constant

Sigma

Observations

1,087
1,087
1,087
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table&6(&Risk&Regressions&(OLS)
VARIABLES
Risk willingness (crop)
Risk willingness (general)
Risk willingness (health)
Constant

Risk
Aversion
0.0440**
(0.02)
0.0104
(0.02)
-0.0244
(0.02)
3.269***
(0.15)

Observations
1,087
R-squared
0.006
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix
Table&2&(&Eﬀects&on&Savings&(2006)
Constant
Head3of3household=3male
Self3reported3health3status
Literate3
Joint3decisions3made3in3the3home
Self3reported3"progressive3farmer"
Pessimism
Self3Conﬁdence
PaKent
Risk3Aversion

(1)
29078.473***
(9215.424)
7295.685
(5150.202)
=370.0936
(1525.05)
=5141.845
(3996.704)
3=1535.817
(3831.229)
=6463.097***
(2242.04)
=1945.414
(1772.644)
1285.067
(1283.526)
4582.3693
(35410.306)
3=626.5498
(734.7206)

Total3number3of3types3of3trees
Total3area3of3land3(acres)
Total3number3of3growing3seasons3for3plots

(2)
25953.38***
(8628.561)

(3)
13165.2733
(8993.116)

=3.849397
(4.146463)
1167.748***
(317.5041)
=10489.1
(8277.055)

3=2.065095
(3.900135)
483.97593
(311.1298)
=10955.273
(7805.279)
6.08507***333
(1.546002)
3=4557.48833
3(8042.958)
3=.19215793333
(.146484)
3=1.882884333
(1.410055)
31.911439333
(3.601453)
=3427.009333
(9274.786)
32.161629***333
(.2860632)
31.726696*333
(.9178583)
31623.66*333
(891.3093)
7.998517***333
(1.624636)
31.199257333
3(.858867)
8230.273*333
(4488.352)

Spending3on3chemical3protecKon3(MK)
Child3labor3used3
Spending3on3ferKlizer
Spending3on3general3implementaKon3tools
Spending3on3irrigaKon
Is3machine3labor3used
Spending3on3manual3labor
Spending3on3manure
Mean3number3of3vendors
Spending3on3oxen3labor
Total3crops3produced3(kgs)
RaKo3of3sole3to3intercropped3crops
Rental3price3of3plot3(MK)
Total3value3of3seeds3(MK)
Total3value3of3crops3(MK)
Variance3in3revenue3
Number3of3ROSCAs3involved3in
Net3Remi\ances
Income
DramaKc3income3risk3faced3in3last3ﬁve3years
R2

0.0209

0.0141

0.1455

(4)
15051*333
(9166.236)3

3=.3952879333
(3.956001)
3751.341**333
(361.2958)
=9569.999333
(7798.534)3
6.290622***3333
(1.56257)
=5203.0873333
(8039.94)
3=.1699207333
(.1463678)
3=1.918878333
(1.406119)
1.725821333
(3.606195)
=4443.161333
(9256.775)
2.158189***333
(.285918)
1.750262*333
(.9164308)
1722.888*333
(904.1855)
37.96548***333
(1.620767)
31.0140373333
(.912871)
8511.142*333
(4499.138)
=.0502216333
(.0396027)
.0065386333
(.5233473)
3=.0081441333
(.0125771)
3.0050957333
(.0043523)
=1134.434333
(5142.534)3
=1.444276**333
(.7056035)
.068911**33
(.0289565)3
=6168.131*333
(3353.726)
0.0229

0.0127
0.0114
0.1335
0.0157
Adjusted3R2
*Signiﬁcant3under3a310%3signiﬁcance3level,3**Signiﬁcant3under3a35%3signiﬁcance3level,3***Signiﬁcant3under3a31%3signiﬁcance3level
(Standard3errors3are3in3parentheses)

(5)
17069.01333
(12303.37)
5941.791333
(4843.762)
3=168.0023333
(1451.848)
3=866.5015333
(3797.122)
=1874.384333
(3613.623)
=2742.1743333
(2146.86)
=1105.012333
(1680.897)
919.9851333
(1208.543)
2684.888333
(5097.806)
=399.0371333
(699.0598)
=.5536257333
(3.976799)
773.7249**333
(363.8253)
3'=9148.424333
(7858.579)
6.163882***33
(1.570949)
=6237.375333
(8117.605)
=.146673133
(.1478409)
=1.975107333
(1.410943)
1.28094333
(3.618156)3
=5497.446333
(9329.367)
2.091197***333
(.2888474)
1.66997*3333
(.922256)
1778.361**333
(906.7233)
7.551867***3333
(1.63492)
.9875489333
(.9186849)
38318.112*333
(4525.319)3
=.0537899333
(.0400251)
=.0381792333
(.5265184)
3'=.007285533
(.0126324)
.0047806333
(.0043844)
=1390.645333
(5170.973)
=1.40112**333
(.7108451)
.0652884**333
(.0290448)
3=6069.602*333
(3380.245)
0.16
0.14
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Table&3&(&Eﬀects&on&Credit
Constant
Head3of3household=3male
Self3reported3health3status
Literate3
Joint3decisions3made3in3the3home
Self3reported3"progressive3farmer"
Pessimism
Self3Conﬁdence
PaKent
Risk3Aversion

(1)
11026.99**33
(5573.065)
2026.174333
(3114.606)
=357.5365333
(922.2801)
=1326.881333
(2417.023)
=5048.641**33
(2316.951)
=1840.291333
(1355.883)
=895.1317333
(1072.014)
850.865733
(776.2173)
1488.186333
(3271.904)
=540.1347333
(444.3253)

(2)
5976.699***333
(1953.264)

(3)
1193.845333
(3216.646)

Total3number3of3types3of3trees
Total3area3of3land3(acres)
Total3number3of3growing3seasons3for3plots
.289870833
(.9826957)
=1977.3963333
(5104.47)
.0322782333
(.0914957)
3.997538***333
(.8934888)

Spending3on3chemical3protecKon3(MK)
Child3labor3used3
Spending3on3ferKlizer
Spending3on3general3implementaKon3tools
Spending3on3irrigaKon

=2265.968333
(5860.259)
.6013465***333
(.1703301)
.8172603333
(.5798305)
=387.6083333
(563.7879)
=1.048404333
(1.031554)

Is3machine3labor3used
Spending3on3manual3labor
Spending3on3manure
Mean3number3of3vendors
Spending3on3oxen3labor
Total3crops3produced3(kgs)

3086.898333
(2822.122)

RaKo3of3sole3to3intercropped3crops
.0006773333
(.0204738)
.1796666333
(.3071508)
.0024074333
(.0081189)
.0058309**333
(.0028199)
1070.845333
(3303.483)
.1643746333
(.4521974)
=.0099072333
(.0188008)

Rental3price3of3plot3(MK)
Total3value3of3seeds3(MK)
Total3value3of3crops3(MK)
Variance3in3revenue3
Number3of3ROSCAs3involved3in
Net3Remi[ances
Income

=147.6872333
(264.4536)

Risk3willingness3w/3crops
=3845.42*333
(2162.106)

DramaKc3income3risk3faced3in3last3ﬁve3years
R

2

.0058168**333
(.0027641)

(4)
6184.373333
(7879.743)3
1887.11933
(3102.208)
=261.709333
(929.8423)
=462.2193333
(2431.883)
3=4419.911*3333
(2314.36)
=1489.239333
(1374.966)
=961.9425333
(1076.538)
769.7833333
(774.0166)
737.4086333
(3264.911)
=471.6262333
(447.7158)
=.6196356333
(2.546958)
78.78061333
(233.0135)
2210.941333
(5033.06)
.3274367333
(1.006121)
=2117.252333
(5198.954)
.0473375333
(.0946853)
33.953489***333
(.9036445)
=.752371433
(2.317263)
3=2508.411333
(5975.032)
.514193***33
(.1849935)3
.7492868333
(.5906627)
=293.7937333
(580.7148)
=1.23217333
(1.047091)
3.1464093333
(.5883756)
3048.764333
(2898.26)
3=.0054049333
(.0256342)
3=.0398007333
(.3372109)
.0015856333
(.0080905)
3.0054467*3333
(.002808)
271.898333
(3311.772)
.0870263333
.4552637
3=.0111713333
.0186018

0.0114

0.0079

3=2966.459333
(2164.892)
0.0437

0.0538

0.0032
=0.0004
0.0321
0.0251
Adjusted3R2
*Signiﬁcant3under3a310%3signiﬁcance3level,3**Signiﬁcant3under3a35%3signiﬁcance3level,3***Signiﬁcant3under3a31%3signiﬁcance3level
(Standard3errors3are3in3parentheses)
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Table&4&(&Eﬀects&on&Net&Savings
Constant
Head3of3household=3male
Self3reported3health3status
Literate3
Joint3decisions3made3in3the3home
Self3reported3"progressive3farmer"
Pessimism
Self3Conﬁdence
PaKent
Risk3Aversion

(1)
18051.48*333
(10754.28)
5269.5113333
(6010.22)
=12.55715333
(1779.714)
=3814.964333
(4664.102)
3512.824333
(4470.995)
=4622.807*333
(2616.432)
=1050.282333
(2068.653)
434.2012333
(1497.858)
3094.182333
(6313.758)
=86.41512333
(857.4096)

(2)
16383.24***333
(3665.018)

=3.849397
(4.146463)
1167.748***
(317.5041)
=10489.1
(8277.055)

Total3number3of3types3of3trees
Total3area3of3land3(acres)
Total3number3of3growing3seasons3for3plots
Spending3on3chemical3protecKon3(MK)
Child3labor3used3
Spending3on3ferKlizer
Spending3on3general3implementaKon3tools
Spending3on3irrigaKon
Is3machine3labor3used
Spending3on3manual3labor
Spending3on3manure
Mean3number3of3vendors
Spending3on3oxen3labor
Total3crops3produced3(kgs)
RaKo3of3sole3to3intercropped3crops

(4)
14360.16333
(10769.09)

3=2.065095
(3.900135)
483.97593
(311.1298)
=10955.273
(7805.279)
6.08507***333
(1.546002)
3=4557.48833
3(8042.958)
3=.19215793333
(.146484)
3=1.882884333
(1.410055)
31.911439333
(3.601453)
=3427.009333
(9274.786)
32.161629***333
(.2860632)
31.726696*333
(.9178583)
31623.66*333
(891.3093)
7.998517***333
(1.624636)
31.199257333
3(.858867)
8230.273*333
(4488.352)

=1.066905333
(4.670339)
428.0087333
(372.5721)
=12137.64333
(9346.674)
5.767064***33
(1.851309)
=2286.832333
(9631.291)
=.2204826333
(.1754118)
=5.870712***333
(1.688514)
2.651214333
(4.312673)
=1025.522333
(11106.38)
1.587348***33
(.3425554)
.9452997333
(1.099118)
2018.784*333
(1067.326)
9.088327***333
(1.945471)
1.002663333
(1.028477)
5033.942333
(5374.718)

.0217325333
(.0393071)
1.425613**333
(.5870271)
.0004482333
(.0155902)
=.0006942333
(.005412)
676.4798333
(6343.282)
=1.10348933
(.8676961)
.0833531**333
(.0360076)
=3386.4833
(4143.811)

Rental3price3of3plot3(MK)
Total3value3of3seeds3(MK)
Total3value3of3crops3(MK)
Variance3in3revenue3
Number3of3ROSCAs3involved3in
Net3Remi[ances
Income
DramaKc3income3risk3faced3in3last3ﬁve3years
R2

(3)
13165.2733
(8993.116)

0.0209

0.0132

0.1455

0.0884

0.0127
0.0059
0.1335
0.0757
Adjusted3R2
*Signiﬁcant3under3a310%3signiﬁcance3level,3**Signiﬁcant3under3a35%3signiﬁcance3level,3***Signiﬁcant3under3a31%3signiﬁcance3level
(Standard3errors3are3in3parentheses)

(5)
10884.64333
(14815.05)
4054.673333
(5832.596)
93.70668333
(1748.237)
=404.282233
(4572.288)
2545.527333
(4351.329)
=1252.935333
(2585.133)
=143.0694333
(2024.046)
150.2018333
(1455.262)
1947.48333
(6138.501)
72.58907333
(841.7699)
.0660098333
(4.788646)
694.9443333
(438.0987)
=11359.3633
(9462.874)
5.836445***333
(1.891651)
=4120.1233333
(9774.78)
=.19401063333
(.178022)
=5.928597***333
(1.698981)
2.033311333
(4.356787)
=2989.03633
(11233.92)
1.577004***333
(.3478144)
.9206834333
(1.110531)
2072.154*333
(1091.827)
8.784037***333
(1.968682)
.8411396333
(1.106231)
5269.348333
(5449.144)
=.048385333
(.048196)
.0016215333
(.6340049)
=.008871333
(.0152112)
=.0006661333
(.0052795)
=1662.543333
(6226.606)
=1.488146*333
(.8559611)
.0764597**333
(.0349741)
=3103.144333
(4070.308)
0.0986
0.0713
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-2.515
(15.08)

(1)
Implement
Spending

6,201**
(3102)

1246
(4807)

(2)
Revenue
Variance

0.000167
(.00409)

0.00691*
(0.00405)

0.0159**
(0.00627)

0.0141***
(0.00286)

-0.00368
(0.003)

0.00661**
(0.003)

0.00308
(0.00465)

4.03E-05
(1.10E-04)

3.415
(8.279)

-2.856
(8.79)

1.279
(8.70)

-10.81
(13.48)

6.59e-07***
(1.91E-07)

-0.0219
(0.0144)

-0.0330**
(0.0153)

0.0288*
(0.0152)

-0.0122
(0.0235)

(6)
Mean Vendors

4.75E-05
(1.87E-04)

12.58
(14.13)

-0.351
(15.01)

4.366
(14.85)

-44.61*
(23.01)

(7)
Manure
Spending

-4.16E-04
(6.68E-04)

-76.53
(50.4)

-0.62
(53.51)

23.5
(52.95)

-77.36
(82.07)

(8)
Manual Labor
Spending

-3.10E-08
(6.18E-07)

-0.108**
(0.0467)

0.0614
(0.0496)

0.0138
(0.049)

0.0298
(0.076)

(9)
Plot Area

3.48E-05
(1.12E-04)

-19.01**
(8.478)

-1.979
(9.002)

5.376
(8.907)

14.8
(13.8)

(10)
Chemical
Protection
Spending

Table&5(&Agricultural&Decisions&on&Preferences

Risk Aversion

-2.151
(9.73)

-4055
(3135)

-0.005
(0.00385)

2.03E-08
(3.78E-08)

(5)
Oxen Labor

Risk
Willingness
(general)
-3.619
(9.833)

-5,977**
(2952)

3.20E-08
(5.10E-08)

(4)
Sole Ratio

Risk
Willingness
(crop)
1.494
(9.261)

1.21E-03
(3.91E-02)

140.5*
(83.43)

(3)
Dramatic Risk

Risk
Willingness
(health)
-3.25E-05
(1.23E-04)

4.076***
(0.459)

VARIABLES

Time
Discount

2,194***
(496)

1087
0.006

351.7**
(139.1)

1087
0.006

1.308***
(0.142)

1087
0.003

246.6***
(81.47)

1087
0.005

0.770***
(0.0281)

1087
0.019

0.668***
(0.0379)

1087
0.001

48,331*
(29052)

1087
0.038

103.6
(91.13)

1087
0.01

Constant

Observations
1087
1087
R-squared
0
0.007
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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